In
his 1961 book, “Madness and Civilization,” Michel Foucault argued that psychiatry
is not an objective, neutral science, but a tool of social control. He stated
that society uses definitions of "madness" and "reason" to
police behavior, enforce conformity, and silence people who disrupt social
order. He further stated that rather than simply discovering natural illnesses
inside the brain, society constructs the boundary between "reason"
and "madness" to manage anyone who threatens economic productivity,
social order, or accepted morality.
Foucault regarded madness and modern concepts of mental illness as social constructs because he saw them as products of shifting historical norms, power dynamics, and social institutions rather than purely objective, timeless medical facts. Foucault traces how Western society created a sharp divide between rationality and irrationality—a divide that was not always fixed.
According to Foucault, society defines what counts as normal and rational by marking certain behaviours or people as irrational and deviant, often medicalizing social deviance. Foucault argued that how societies understand and respond to "madness" changes across eras.
Foucault stated that psychiatric knowledge and medical categories do not simply discover neutral truths; they help define what counts as "normal" and "abnormal". Labelling behaviour as pathology gives institutions and authorities power to regulate, classify, and manage people who deviate from social expectations.
Foucault pointed out that modern medicalized psychiatry turned madness into an object of expert diagnosis while marginalizing the direct voice and lived experience of the person labelled "mad."
Foucault rejected the idea that modern psychiatry represents an inevitable, purely scientific march of human progress, arguing instead that its concepts are tied to specific cultural and political arrangements.
Lobotomies in America: A Failed
Psychiatric Miracle
Between the late 1930s and the 1950s, tens of thousands of psychiatric patients in the United States underwent lobotomies, a controversial psychosurgical procedure aimed at severing nerve pathways in the brain's prefrontal cortex to treat severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Introduced by Portuguese neurologist António Egas Moniz and aggressively popularized in America by physician Walter Freeman—who developed the rapid "transorbital" or ice-pick lobotomy—the procedure was widely hailed as a miracle cure to empty overcrowded state mental asylums.
Despite its widespread adoption, the lobotomy proved largely irrelevant as a true medical cure because it did not treat the underlying psychiatric disorders, instead masking symptoms by destroying higher cognitive functions. Its harmful effects were devastating and irreversible, frequently leaving patients with severe personality changes, emotional blunting, intellectual impairment, incontinence, seizures, vegetative states, or death—notably seen in high-profile cases like Rosemary Kennedy.
Lobotomy stands as one of the darkest chapters in modern medical history—a scientifically invalidated, barbaric practice driven by institutional desperation rather than genuine patient welfare. Foucault’s ideas strongly condemn practices like psychosurgery as extreme tools of institutional control and bodily subjugation.
Sluggish Schizophrenia As a Political
Weapon
Sluggish schizophrenia was a discredited Soviet psychiatric diagnosis used to suppress political dissent. Developed in the 1960s by psychiatrist Andrei Snezhnevsky, it relied on vague criteria such as “anti-Soviet thinking,” “overvalued ideas,” and “delusions of reformism.”
Soviet authorities sometimes portrayed dissatisfaction with a system that provided education, employment, and subsidized housing as evidence of mental illness. In practice, critics of the Communist Party and human-rights activists could be labelled mentally ill and confined indefinitely in psychiatric hospitals. The diagnosis was not accepted by the World Health Organization or the international medical community.
Human-rights activist Vladimir Bukovsky, arrested in 1963 for possessing banned literature, was diagnosed with the condition. After years in psychiatric prisons, he smuggled more than 150 pages of official psychiatric evaluations to Western specialists in 1971, helping expose the use of forced treatment against dissidents. Major General Pyotr Grigorenko was another prominent political dissident confined in Soviet psychiatric hospitals.
Sluggish schizophrenia became a textbook real-world example of Michel Foucault’s warning about power/knowledge—showing how state authorities can define political nonconformity as "madness" to strip citizens of their rights and credibility under the guise of medical care.
Rosenhan Experiment
In 1973, Stanford University psychologist David Rosenhan published a landmark study in the journal Science titled "On Being Sane in Insane Places," which set out to test whether psychiatric hospital staff could reliably tell the difference between sane individuals and genuinely mentally ill patients.
Rosenhan designed a two-part field experiment. In the first phase, Rosenhan and seven mentally healthy volunteers—comprising graduate students, a psychologist, a pediatrician, a painter, and a housewife—acted as "pseudopatients" and sought admission to 12 different psychiatric hospitals across five U.S. states.
Each participant called for an appointment and reported a single fabricated symptom: hearing an unfamiliar, same-sex voice saying the words "empty," "hollow," or "thud." Aside from using fake names and occupations and claiming this isolated audio hallucination, every volunteer gave completely truthful accounts of their life histories, relationships, and emotional states.
Despite displaying no other signs of illness, all eight were admitted—seven diagnosed with schizophrenia and one with manic-depressive psychosis. Once inside the psychiatric wards, the pseudopatients immediately stopped simulating any symptoms, behaved completely normally, and informed the staff that they felt fine and no longer heard voices. They cooperated with ward routines, openly took written notes about hospital life, and secretly flushed their prescribed antipsychotic medications down the toilet. Despite their normal behavior, the medical staff never detected that any of the eight were faking, even though many actual patients on the wards quickly suspected they were undercover journalists or professors.
Instead, nurses and doctors interpreted ordinary actions through the lens of their diagnosis, recording their note-taking in medical charts as "writing behavior" and treating it as a symptom of paranoia. The pseudopatients were kept hospitalized for anywhere from 7 to 52 days, averaging 19 days, and were only discharged after agreeing with the doctors that they were mentally ill and accepting release with a diagnosis of schizophrenia "in remission"—a label that implied the illness had merely subsided rather than never existed.
In the second phase of the study, a skeptical research and teaching hospital challenged Rosenhan to send pseudopatients to their facility over a three-month period, boasting that their staff would easily catch the impostors. Rosenhan agreed to the test, and hospital staff subsequently rated every incoming patient on a ten-point scale, flagging 41 out of 193 new patients as suspected fakes—even though Rosenhan had secretly sent zero pseudopatients during that entire period.
David Rosenhan concluded that psychiatric diagnoses are not reliable, objective medical assessments, because hospital staff cannot distinguish the sane from the insane once a diagnostic label is applied. David Rosenhan’s experiment served as real-world empirical proof that reinforced Foucault’s arguments during his 1970s lectures on psychiatric power.
The Case of P.P. Jamis
The case of P.P. Jamis illustrates how a person can remain confined in an institution despite no longer needing treatment. After committing an offence in 1958, Jamis was sent to Angoda Mental Hospital in Sri Lanka for evaluation. A judge found him mentally ill and unfit to stand trial, and ordered his detention in the hospital’s forensic unit.
Although doctors later treated him successfully and deemed him fit, he remained there for 50 years, from age 34 to 84. The hospital could not release him directly into the community and could only transfer him to prison authorities, who in turn required a court order. Because his case file had been lost, the courts never summoned him.
Following intervention by activists, Jamis was released on bail in 2008. His case exposed a profound failure of coordination and legal oversight among the judiciary, prison system, and mental health authorities. The case of P.P. Jamis reveals that the greatest harm surrounding mental illness often comes not from the illness itself, but from how legal and medical institutions treat people once they are labelled.
P.P. Jamis’s story serves as a stark, real-world validation of Michel Foucault’s core claims about how psychiatric and legal institutions exercise power—showing how an asylum can strip an individual of legal rights and human agency indefinitely, even after they are cured.
Medicalizing Childhood Behavior
The debate over the diagnosis of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and the prescribing of stimulant medications such as Ritalin (methylphenidate) in North America concerns whether increasing diagnosis rates reflect improved clinical recognition or the medicalization of ordinary childhood behaviour and responses to academic pressure.
Behaviours associated with ADHD can also arise in other circumstances: children exposed to severe stress or domestic violence, for example, may show similar symptoms, while anxiety and vitamin B deficiencies may also contribute to attention and behaviour difficulties. These possibilities underscore the importance of careful assessment before diagnosis or treatment.
Over-diagnosis and inappropriate prescribing may expose children to medication risks and affect their developing brain chemistry, making it essential to consider alternative explanations and individual circumstances.
Professor Hans Eysenck's Claim
Professor Hans Eysenck argued that psychological abnormality should not be treated as a distinct category of disease. Instead, he proposed that it represents an extreme position on continuous, measurable personality dimensions that are present in everyone. Using mathematical factor analysis, Eysenck developed the Continuity Hypothesis, which challenges the idea that normality and abnormality are entirely separate states. Under this view, mental disorders reflect unusually pronounced statistical variations in ordinary personality traits.
The Sane Society and the Mentally Ill
The psychologist Erich Fromm proposed that not just individuals but entire societies “may be lacking in sanity.” Eric Fromm further says that “yet many psychiatrists and psychologists refuse to entertain the idea that society as a whole may be lacking in sanity. They hold that the problem of mental health in a society is only that of the number of” unadjusted’ individuals and not of a possible un-adjustment of the culture itself.
Dr. Beryl Logan -York University – Department of Philosophy
Dr. Neil J Fernando – Consultant psychiatrist – Sri Lanka
Dr. Peter Zelina – Psychiatrist -Mackenzie Richmond Hill Hospital Canada




